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This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine
the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis.  For political reasons, most
countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory elements: politically
directed subsidies to selected bank borrowers; subsidized provision of explicit or implicit repayment
guarantees for the creditors of banks that participate in the credit-allocation scheme; and defective
government monitoring and control of the subsidies to leveraged risk-taking that the other two elements
produce. In 2007-2008, technological change and regulatory competition simultaneously encouraged
incentive-conflicted supervisors to outsource much of their due discipline to credit-rating firms and
encouraged banks to securitize their loans in ways that pushed credit risks on poorly underwritten
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Love and Marriage, love and marriage, 
Go together like a horse and carriage. 
This I tell ya, brother, 
Ya can’t have one without the other. 
Jimmy Van Heusen, Our Town (TV, 1955) 
 
Although the yoke between “love and marriage” is markedly more flexible than it 
was in 1955, regulation and supervision remain tightly conjoined.  Regulation focuses on 
rules; supervision looks to their enforcement.  Etymologically, regulation is a 
grammatical extension of regula: the Latin word for “rules.” In every country, 
governments make rules that define formally what a bank is, what different kinds of 
things banking organizations may and may not do, how and where bankers may and may 
not do permissible things, and what reciprocal rights and duties bankers and regulators 
owe to one another. Moreover, for compelling historical, cultural, economic, and political 
reasons, these definitions vary across countries—often greatly (Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine, 2006). 
Differences in rules and enforcement support what has become a worldwide 
market for regulatory services. Just as bank managers might explore the market for any 
other support service that they plan to outsource, they sort through alternative regulatory 
schemes to ascertain the particular jurisdiction that offers them the best mix of costs and 
benefits for the various pieces of their product lines.  In the absence of switching costs, 
each bank would design a series of substitute asset, liability, and hedging instruments and 
negotiate with (i.e., “lobby”) would-be suppliers so that each deal they write could be 
booked in the most favorable jurisdiction.   
To sort out cross-country and cross-product differences in the quality and offering 
prices of different regulatory entities, this paper develops the concept of an incentive-  2 
conflicted regulatory culture.  In each country, the broad outline of this culture is 
determined by inherited ethical norms for individual, industry, and government behavior. 
However, the institutional details that constitute a particular regulatory scheme and go on 
to shape its particular policy instruments and their operative costs and benefits are 
developed cooperatively in response to the push and pull of lobbying pressures. The 
conflict between a top regulator’s duties and outside political forces incorporates into 
every real-world system of bank regulation contradictory controls and subsidies that, 
when left unchallenged through time, tempt client banks to expose themselves to a 
growing chance of economic insolvency.  
Many countries have experienced a banking crisis in recent years (Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 1996; Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003). Of these crises, a high proportion was 
triggered by losses generated by government efforts to allocate bank credit to well-
connected firms in politically influential sectors.  The upside of these crises is that, in 
exposing inefficient, contradictory, and antiegalitarian elements of regulatory policies in 
particular countries, they generate pressure for effective reform. 
I. Ethics of Supervision 
Economic theory presumes that, subject to external constraints, individuals 
choose a series of behaviors that maximize through time a personal objective function.  
Rules come into existence in situations where people fear that gaps in other individuals’ 
ethical standards might allow them to behave in ways that would jeopardize the goals of a 
rule-making community to which they belong.  
To constrain the choices that targeted parties make, rules must be backed up by 
supervision. Supervision entails surveillance and enforcement. Regulated parties 
(“regulatees”) must be supervised when—and to the extent that—their objective 
functions tempt them to make themselves better off by disobeying either the spirit or the 
letter of particular rules.  
A bank’s incentive to circumvent or violate a given rule increases with the weight 
of the burdens that full compliance threatens to impose on its efforts to create value and 
manage risk.  Dutiful enforcement revises bank incentives by rewarding compliance, 
punishing evasion, and searching out and closing loopholes that regulatees might use to 
skirt the rules.    3 
Rulemakers spell out the behaviors that they wish either to avoid or to promote in 
capital letters and usually in language almost anyone can understand. However, most 
rules contain a set of loopholes that is communicated either in very small print or in 
coded language that only the lobbyists that sponsored them can immediately see or 
understand. To quantify the economic burden of any rule, one must study not only the 
costs and benefits of compliance, but the opportunity costs of circumvention as well. 
Loopholes sustain gaps in supervisory enforcement that generate a second set of 
rules. These secondary rules are designed to discourage appeals to higher authority and 
are at least partially conjectural.  For example, although the formal speed limit on a given 
highway might be posted at (say) 55 miles per hour, drivers confidently expect the limit 
that police actually enforce to be higher than the posted one and to adapt predictably to 
exceptional circumstances (such as personal emergencies) as these unfold.   
Common law and the Commonsense School of ethical theory maintain that, 
across any contract in which one party delegates authority to one or more others, agents 
and principals owe one another duties of loyalty, competence, and care. On this 
hypothesis, supervisors owe four key duties to the community that employs them: 
1. A duty of vision: They should continually adapt their surveillance systems to 
counter regulatee efforts to disguise their rulebreaking; 
2. A duty of prompt corrective action: They should stand ready to discipline 
rulebreakers whenever a violation is observed; 
3. A duty of efficient operation: They should produce their services at minimum 
cost; 
4. A duty of conscientious representation: They should be prepared to put the 
interest of the community they serve ahead of their own. 
In principle, supervisors committed to the fourth duty would bond themselves to disclose 
enough information about their decisionmaking to allow the community to make them 
accountable for neglecting or abusing these responsibilities.  In practice, institutional 
arrangements do not hold supervisors strongly accountable for the distributional effects 
of how they resolve incentive conflicts. To the contrary and in country after country, 
politicians require bank lending to favor designated sectors of the economy. To obtain a   4 
quid pro quo, bank stakeholders expect these loans to be supervised with a lighter hand, 
especially in times of banking turmoil (Kane, 1989).  
Traditionally, supervisory duties have been exercised locally and—in a narrow 
and formal sense—schemes for regulating and supervising banks are still shaped and 
administered on a nation-by-nation basis. Changes in rules and duties respond to the 
interplay of economic events with changing governmental goals and with the waxing and 
waning of industry pressure to relax burdensome rules or to control disruptive behaviors.  
Kane (1977, 1981, and 1988) describes a dialectical process in which regulation-induced 
innovation engenders regulatory adjustments and regulatory adjustments (termed re-
regulation) engender new sources of regulatee avoidance.  
Today, national schemes and resulting regulatee burdens are increasingly being 
influenced by competition from foreign regulatory systems. In world markets, 
movements of financial capital and changing asset values overlay onto the domestic 
policy scene a series of unfamiliar political, economic, and reputational pressures that 
individual-country regulatory decisionmakers must take into account.  Arguably, these 
pressures have persuaded authorities in financial-center countries to acquiesce in 
loophole-ridden agreements for coordinating cross-country supervision (Basel I and II). 
This paper introduces the concept of a regulation-induced financial crisis and uses 
it to explain how offshore regulatory competition can either reinforce or attenuate 
inefficient or antiegalitarian elements of incentive-conflicted banking regulation in 
individual countries.  Regulatory competition does this mainly by inducing increases and 
decreases in the banking business a country’s banks can capture.  With technological 
change intensifying the influence of offshore regulators, mis-steps promise to come to a 
boil sooner, but may still have severe and long-lasting effects on ordinary taxpayers.  
This chapter exemplifies the process by analyzing how regulatory competition 
simultaneously encouraged incentive-conflicted supervisors to outsource much of their 
due discipline to credit-rating firms and encouraged banks to securitize their loans in 
ways that pushed credit risks into corners of the universe where supervisors and credit-
ratings firms could not see them. 
II.  The Market for Regulatory Services and Its Imperfections   5 
Although a large literature treats banking regulation as if it were simply a tax on 
bank income, bankers understand that banking regulation is better conceived as a back-
office financial service that, for participants in banking markets, generates benefits as 
well as costs.  Its benefits lie in three realms:  improving customer confidence, improving 
customer convenience, and supporting or resisting bank efforts to accumulate and 
exercise market power.  Because banking regulation requires resources to produce, 
authorities can both produce it more or less efficiently and finance it more or less fairly.  
Whether or not the costs of producing regulation are minimized, political activity 
determines its level and allocates its production costs across society.  Any firm or 
individual implicitly pays an endogenously determined price for regulatory services. This 
price corresponds to the difference between the benefits that firm or household receives 
from bank regulation and the costs that banking regulation imposes on it. We conceive of 
this variable as a given taxpayer’s “net regulatory benefit (or burden) from banking 
regulation,” or NRB. 
Parties that feel a stake in banking regulation routinely join together into political 
coalitions and lobby collectively for improvements in their NRBs.  In principle, each 
sector’s lobbyists compete self-interestedly with lobbyists from other sectors to generate 
regulatory benefits for their members and to shift the costs of financing their production 
toward parties located in other sectors. 
In a world in which banking markets are globalized, services that provide 
regulatory benefits are available from foreign as well as domestic suppliers.  Hence, the 
struggle by citizens and firms of any one country to maximize net benefits spills across 
its borders into what has become a worldwide market for financial regulation. 
The market for regulatory services comprises a body of persons that carry on 
extensive transactions in the specific activity of promulgating, enforcing, and accepting 
regulatory restrictions.  Regulation is supplied competitively and accepted voluntarily to 
the extent that entry and exit opportunities exist for banks willing to incur the transaction 
costs of switching all or part of their regulatory business to another supplier.  Hence, 
although a regulator’s clientele is fixed in the very short run, the jurisdictions in which a 
regulatee operates are voluntary over longer periods.  Geographic overlaps in the global 
market for financial regulatory services have expanded as entry and exit costs for foreign   6 
financial institutions have declined around the world.  Ongoing downward trends in costs 
of entering and exiting offshore financial markets render the margin of regulatory 
competition—even in developing countries—increasingly global. 
Rules and enforcement systems are continually tested and reshaped by changes in 
the net regulatory benefits that other jurisdictions offer. Nevertheless, jurisdictional 
competition for most financial products is inherently imperfect.  An incumbent regulator 
may be said to have market power in any line in which it can lower the NRB it offers 
clients without completely surrendering its clientele to another regulator.  Alternatively, 
we might say that the leaders of a regulatory agency have market power whenever the 
various labor, capital, and political markets from which they draw economic resources 
cannot hold them (and the elected politicians that appoint and sustain them) accountable 
for policy decisions that simultaneously lower net regulatory burdens for their clientele of 
lenders and borrowers and increase them for other important economic sectors. 
The vigor of regulatory competition is enhanced by technological change and 
diminished by information asymmetries, leadership turnover, and various sources of 
principal-agent conflict that are inherent in governmental decisionmaking.  The essence 
of a government’s social contract is that taxpayers—as principals—award financial 
resources and coercive powers to governmental agents.  Taxpayers hope that government 
officials will exercise the assigned powers to promote the “common good.” However, the 
common good cannot be observationally defined. Moreover, especially in the short run, 
an agency’s conception of the common good may be distorted by sectoral pressures. 
Regulators routinely adopt reporting systems that make it difficult for citizens to 
gather information either about subsidiary goals that policymakers might be pursuing or 
about sectoral, bureaucratic, or personal benefits that regulatory activity might generate. 
Even when evidence of discriminatory or inefficient performance surfaces, it is difficult 
for outside observers to sort out its root causes or to correct the incentive defects 
responsible for it. 
The value of regulatory competition lies in supplying indirect economic checks on 
the even-handedness and efficiency of net regulatory burdens.  On the demand side, 
competition encourages parties that feel overburdened by their government’s system of 
regulation to reconfigure their business to slide it into the jurisdiction of a more-  7 
advantageous supplier of regulatory services.  It does not matter whether the new supplier 
is domestic agency or a foreign one.  What matters is that the regulators gain some relief, 
the new regulator gains budgetary resources, and the old regulator loses them. The lower 
the transition costs of moving to a less burdensome regulatory supplier, the more 
complete the demand-side check becomes. 
On the supply side, entry and exit costs confer competitive advantages on 
incumbent regulators. In competing with would-be private regulatory enterprises, 
government entities are advantaged by the financial strength imparted to them by the 
presumption that they can assign catastrophic losses to taxpayers and by their ready 
access to the coercive power of the state. To a nontraditional supplier, the costs of 
actively gearing up to oversee even a narrow category of banking deals can be 
substantial.  The existence of these costs means that the number of potential new entrants 
that can economically supply regulatory services to banks in a given country is relatively 
limited in the short run.   
Successful entry requires more than a capacity for exercising disciplinary power.  
To displace a seasoned regulator, would-be entrants need specific skills, a source of 
moral authority, and substantial financial and reputational capital.  Entrants must be able 
to promise credibly that they can fairly and efficiently produce regulatory services and 
are committed and able to sustain this promise for a long while.  They must be able to 
manipulate system of rewards and punishments that is strong enough to change the 
behavior of potential regulatees.  The entry of newly chartered private regulators into 
regulatory arenas is discouraged by the costs of accumulating sufficient public standing 
and moral authority to be trusted with this kind of coercive authority.   
In brief, the inherited market structure for regulatory services is distorted by 
market power that the law freely gives to government enterprises and by reputational 
advantages enjoyed by incumbent private regulators.  On the one hand, representative 
democracy confers renewable monopoly power on elected politicians and the regulatory 
leaders they appoint.  Because policymaking authority may be canceled by voters or 
limited ex post by the courts, this authority becomes all the stronger, the more confidently 
incumbent politicians may count on holding power and the more that top bureaucrats may   8 
count on holding onto their offices and avoiding vigorous prosecution or public censure 
for questionable acts.   
Even in the private sector, market power is conferred in lasting fashion on a 
successful regulatory enterprise.  It is interesting that such traditionally hard-to-dislodge 
incumbent regulators as a country’s major stock and commodities exchanges are being 
subjected today to pressures from cross-country partners that hope to take over their 
franchise. It is unfortunate that, for key regulatory bureaus, central banks, and ministries 
of finance, takeover discipline cannot be so direct.   
III.  The Role of Incentive Conflicts and Regulatory Subsidies in Banking Fragility 
Banking environments and patterns of banking regulation vary greatly from country 
to country.  Financial-institution supervision combines a capacity to observe fluctuations 
in balance-sheet values (“vision”) with a capacity to influence managerial actions 
(“control”) and an incentive system that governs the pursuit and exercise of these 
capacities.  Even when portfolios and attendant risks are concentrated within a single 
country, it is difficult to establish a combination of adequate oversight of institutional 
balance sheets, adequate authority to intervene in timely fashion, and bureaucratic 
incentives to detect and resolve insolvent institutions in ways that adequately protect 
taxpayer interests.  As a result, individual countries solve this contracting problem in 
different ways. Although many commonalities of interest exist, systems for setting and 
enforcing financial rules are infested with incentive conflict.  Even within a country, 
conflicts exist between and among: 
1.  Regulators and the firms they regulate; 
2.  Particular regulators and other societal watchdogs; 
3.  Regulators and the politicians to whom they must report; 
4.  Taxpayers and the politicians and regulators they put in office. 
  How a country approaches and resolves these conflicts is in part hard-wired into 
its political and institutional structure.  For example, while many EU countries supervise 
banks separately from other financial institutions, some do not.  A few European 
countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom, in particular) have established agencies that supervise bank and nonbank   9 
financial institutions in an integrated way; others have to some degree integrated the 
oversight of at least their bank and securities sectors (Schüler, 2003). 
  Every country relies on its ethical norms, government regulators, and other 
professional watchdogs to bridge gaps in the bonding, deterrent rights (deterrency), and 
transparency inherent in its private contracting environment.  Over time, the interaction 
of private and government watchdogs generates a regulatory culture.  A culture may be 
defined as customs, ideas, and attitudes that members of a group share and transmit from 
generation to generation by systems of subtle and unsubtle rewards and punishments.  A 
regulatory culture constrains the ways in which an uncooperative or even unscrupulous 
individual bank can be monitored and disciplined.  It comprises a matrix of attitudes and 
beliefs about how regulators should act.  These slowly changing attitudes and beliefs 
often express a distrust of government power that traces back to abuses observed in a 
possibly distant past when the country was occupied, colonized, or run by a one-party 
government.  The culture’s taboos and traditions define standards for the fair use of 
government power.  Behind these standards are higher-order social norms that underlie a 
nation’s political and legal environments. 
  The character of a country’s Regulatory Culture is spanned by six specific 
components: 
•  Legal authority and reporting obligations 
•  Formulation and promulgation of specific rules 
•  Technology of monitoring for violations & compliance 
•  Allowable penalties for material violations 
•  Duties of consultation:  To guarantee fairness, regulated parties enjoy a right to 
procedural due process that specifies burdens of proof that regulators must meet 
before they can penalize violators. 
•  Regulatee rights to judicial review: To bond the fairness guarantee, penalized 
parties have access to inside and outside appeals procedures.   
In large part, the details of each component are shaped by: 
a.  Recognition and response lags generated by the interaction of weakness in 
the transparency of the nation’s accounting system with bureaucratic 
incentives and statutory and bureaucratic checks and balances;   10 
b.  Regulatory competition brought about by the entry of foreign or 
differently regulated institutions; 
c.  Regulatory personnel’s exposure to influence activity from a discipline-
resistant firm’s political clout, consultation rights, and appeal privileges; 
d.  Social norms that protect fraudsters and bumblers against prompt 
regulatory discipline. 
Lobbying activity seeks to reshape the particular norms that officials stress and to 
constrain the tradeoffs they make. Within limits set by a country’s regulatory culture, 
how particular policy strategies officials adopt actually work is determined by regulatees’ 
ability to delay or stymie decisive intervention and to find and exploit circumventive 
loopholes.  Some of these loopholes involve the ability to relocate loss exposures that are 
more closely supervised either by the home country (or by a particular host) to venues 
that monitor or discipline risk-taking less effectively. 
The regulatory cultures of almost every country in the world today embrace in 
one form or another three strategic elements: 
1.  Politically-Directed Subsidies to Selected Bank Borrowers:  The policy 
framework either explicitly requires—or implicitly rewards—banks for 
making credit available to selected classes of borrowers at a subsidized 
interest rate; 
2.  Subsidies to Bank Risk-Taking: The policy framework commits government 
officials to providing on subsidized terms explicit or implicit conjectural 
guarantees of repayment to depositors and other bank creditors; 
3.  Defective Monitoring and Control of the Subsidies: The contracting and 
accounting frameworks used by banks and government officials fail to make 
anyone directly accountable for reporting or controlling the size of either 
subsidy in a conscientious or timely fashion. 
Taken together, the first two elements in the strategy tempt banks to extract 
wealth surreptitiously from taxpayers and constrain loan officers to pass some of the 
benefits to politically favored borrowers [such as builders and would-be homeowners 
(especially low-income households) in the US].  Favored borrowers tend to be blocs of   11 
voters regularly courted by candidates for political office and financial supporters or 
cronies of influential government officials.  
The third piece of the framework minimizes regulators’ exposure to blame when 
things go wrong. It makes it impossible for outsiders to hold supervisors culpable for 
violating their ethical duties. It prevents outsiders from readily monitoring the true costs 
and risks generated by the first two strategies and interferes with efforts to subject the 
intersectoral flow of net regulatory benefits to informed debate.  This gap exists because 
accounting systems do not report the value of regulatory benefits as a separate item for 
banks that receive them. In modern accounting systems, the capitalized value of 
regulatory subsidies is treated instead as an intangible source of value that, if booked at 
all, is not differentiated from other elements of a bank’s so-called “franchise value.” Of 
course, some of the subsidy is offset by tangible losses that politically influenced loans 
eventually force onto bank balance sheets and income statements. In principle, a tangible 
reserve for expected losses ought to be set up as part of the process of making a poorly 
underwritten or deliberately underpriced loan.  Not reserving for losses imbedded in a 
loan’s preferential terms may be conceived as planting a time bomb in the asset and net-
worth values shown on conventional bank balance sheets.  Over time, the cumulative 
damage from politically favored loans becomes harder and harder to hide. Between one 
crisis and the next, the amount of government-favored loans grows larger and larger in 
bank portfolios. Eventually, a shortfall of contractual cash flows makes it harder to gain 
financing for pools of mispriced and poorly structured loans. This is how poorly 
documented mortgage-backed securitizations came acropper in the US and Europe during 
the summer of 2007. Although officials resist the idea, creating an enforceable obligation 
for regulators to estimate in transparent and reproducible ways the ebb and flow of the 
dual subsidies would empower external watchdog organizations in the private sector to 
force authorities to explain whether and how these subsidies benefit taxpayers. 
Sooner or later, savvy large-denomination creditors come to appreciate the 
unreported hole that overvalued loans imbed in the opportunity-cost value of their bank’s 
enterprise-contributed net worth (NWE).  By NWE, we mean the value that an informed 
buyer would pay for the bank if safety-net guarantees did not exist.  If a bank’s NWE 
declines through zero, it becomes a “zombie” institution.  A zombie is an insolvent   12 
institution that stays active only because the black magic of government guarantees 
leaves its creditors with no reason to force it into a corporate grave.  A zombie’s ability to 
renew its deposit funding and other debt depends entirely on the continuing credibility of 
the explicit and implicit government guarantees that safety-net managers attach to its 
obligations.   
Accounting loopholes allow a zombie institution to show positive accounting net 
worth long after its NWE has turned negative. For example, although we now know that 
in June 2007 the British mortgage lender Northern Rock PLC was well on its way to 
becoming a zombie, management was able to post an accounting net worth equal to 
roughly two percent of its assets. 
Systemwide fragility F increases with the number of zombies or near-zombies (Z) 
and with the aggregate size of the losses thought to be imbedded in their economic 
balance sheets: 
        F = F[Z,
j=1
Z
￿ NWE (j)].        (1) 
Funding problems begin not when a bank becomes a zombie, but when suppliers of large-
denomination funds begin to doubt whether officials can or will continue to support its 
existence.  Funding problems for a region’s or country’s banking system are intensified 
when doubts arise about arrangements for making taxpayers absorb the cost of 
guaranteeing the area’s potential zombie institutions.  The triggering condition is that the 
upper bound on the uncertain value of implicit and explicit government guarantees G 
rises so high that taxpayer resistance threatens to make it hard for authorities to raise the 
funds needed to pay the bill promptly or in full.  Massive withdrawals by sophisticated 
creditors are sometimes described as “silent runs,” because servicing the demands that a 
troubled bank receives from large creditors generates far less publicity than the queue of 
panicked small depositors that impatiently mills about in a conventional run.   
However, silent runs greatly weaken bank balance sheets. The deposit outflows 
that troubled banks experience must be financed by selling liquid assets and issuing 
costly debt.  A troubled bank’s first line of defense against a silent run is to arrange loans 
from government institutions or from relatively well-informed banks with which it has 
correspondent relationships.  Private rescuers usually insist on receiving appropriately   13 
high interest rates and demand collateralization and an upside potential for their claims.  
In deciding to help a correspondent bank to weather a silent run, foreign banks are apt 
first to lobby the IMF, the host government, and even their own government for 
assurances that they will not be stuck with the bill for whatever losses the rescue effort 
might incur. 
Until officials increase the transparency and credibility of their credit support, 
silent runs on weak institutions tend to escalate.  Troubled banks’ sales of good assets and 
increasing funding costs reduce future income and make the fragility of their condition 
apparent to more and more outside observers.  When a troubled bank collateralizes its 
good assets at or above their market value, its unbooked losses on poorly performing 
loans become a larger proportion of the assets that remain unpledged.  The more funding 
a troubled bank obtains at high credit spreads, the more severely its future accounting and 
economic profits are squeezed and the more likely it is to engage in go-for-broke lending 
and funding activities that severely pressure the profit margins of healthy competitors. 
A silent run puts pressure on regulators because it progressively undermines the 
willingness of taxpayers and stronger banks to tolerate the regulatory status quo.  As a 
silent run unfolds, reduced profit margins spread zombieness and disturbing information 
is revealed about the size of taxpayers’ potential involvement.  At the same time, net 
regulatory benefits for weak and strong banks diverge more and more widely.  Weak 
banks receive safety-net subsidies from central-bank loans and government guarantees 
that stronger banks and general taxpayers eventually have to pay for.   
The longer a silent run proceeds, the more deeply supervisory efforts to retard the 
exit or to delay the formal recapitalization of inefficient and insolvent deposit institutions 
push the net regulatory benefits of other economic sectors into negative territory. The 
economic and political forces exerted when a large bank suffers open and silent runs are 
nicely illustrated by the British government’s response to the Northern Rock debacle. In 
September 2007, an open depositor run on this bank was stopped by the government’s 
promise to provide emergency funding to the £114 billion institution and to “guarantee 
all existing deposit arrangements.” However, a silent run persisted. By yearend, 
emergency loans from the Bank of England reached about £25 billion and Treasury 
guarantees had been extended to cover most of the bank’s nondeposit obligations as well.   14 
Well-publicized efforts to persuade stockholders and outside acquirers to inject private 
capital into the bank showed little progress. Finally, in February 2008, the bank was 
“temporarily” nationalized. 
IV. Three Exculpatory Norms of Modern Crisis Management 
A severely overleveraged banking system may be portrayed as an accident waiting to 
happen.  A regulation-induced crisis occurs when misfortune impacts a banking system 
whose managers have made their institutions vulnerable to this amount and type of bad 
luck.  Figure One breaks the evolution of a regulation-induced banking crisis into five 
stages. The 2007-08 breakdown of arrangements for financing for structured 
securitizations in the US and Europe, and banking crises that rolled through Latin 
America, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Russia during 
1997-1998 passed through the first three and one-half stages of this model of crisis 
generation and response.   
In 2007-2008, German, British, and American authorities showed again that 
politicians are reluctant to move beyond the stopgap partial recapitalization stage (stage 
4A). As long as the hopelessness of an institution’s situation can be covered up, outsiders 
cannot easily distinguish a wave of financial-institution insolvencies from a transitory 
shortage of aggregate liquidity. In either circumstance, a group of economically 
significant firms find it exceedingly difficult to roll over their liabilities on profitable 
terms. It is an accepted first-response practice for central bankers and other regulators to 
provide liquidity to distressed institutions as a way to buy time for their supervisory staff 
to investigate the extent to which irreparable insolvencies might underlie the distress. 
This time-buying strategy is supported by three exculpatory norms whose ethical force 
intensifies in times of political, market, or institutional turmoil: a mercy norm; a 
nationalistic norm; and a nonescalation norm. 
The mercy norm holds that it is bad policy and unacceptably cruel behavior for 
regulators to abandon the employees, creditors, and stockholders of institutions they 
oversee before they can convincingly establish whether the distress is too fundamental to 
be remedied by subsidized loans. This norm gives regulators the discretion (if not the 
duty) to alleviate the initial pains of any client institution that experiences a silent run.    15 
The nationalistic norm presupposes that regulators should help domestic 
institutions and marketmakers to cope with foreign competition. In practice, this norm is 
reinforced by community resistance to foreign control of national credit decisions and by 
lobbying pressure from politically favored sectors who suspect that foreign banks will not 
serve their interests very well. 
The nonescalation norm allows authorities to lend on subsidized terms to 
distressed institutions as long as they can popularize the view that doing anything else 
would invite a national or global financial disaster. In invoking this norm, officials must 
spread fear. They must argue that, without a large injection of subsidized funds, markets 
will set prices for troubled assets that are unreasonably low and prices for emergency 
credit to institutions that hold these assets that are unreasonably high and that these price 
movements would sweep strong and healthy institutions into the turmoil.  
It is dangerous for government officials both to make these exaggerated claims 
and to deny the increasingly transparent flow of subsidies that partial recapitalization 
entails.  For high-ranking regulators to keep churning out safety-net subsidies, two further 
conditions must hold.  First, they must be able to control the flow of information, so as to 
keep taxpayers and the press from convincingly assessing either the magnitude of the 
implicit capital transfer or the antiegalitarian character of the subsidization scheme.  
Second, the self-interest of top regulators must be continually nourished by praise and 
other forms of tribute from the bankers, borrowers, and investors whose losses are being 
shifted to other parties.   
Authorities are reluctant to move to full recapitalization until overwhelming 
losses reveal themselves in the form of strongly resurging crisis pressures.  The longer 
the game goes on, the greater the risk that the reputations of incoming policymakers and 
the particular politicians that appoint them will be saddled unfairly with the sins of their 
predecessors. Although it is unwise to draw inferences from a sample of two, the U.S. 
savings-and-loan mess and the most recent Argentine crisis cast some light on how costs 
are allocated during the final stages in the life cycle of a regulation-induced crisis.   
Formally, continuations and breakdowns in the burden-shifting process may be 
analyzed as two states of an evolutionary process.  Though small on any given day, the 
probability (p) of a breakdown during an incentive-conflicted regulator’s term in office   16 
increases with the fragility of the system for making good on implicit and explicit safety-
net guarantees. It is convenient to represent the value of these guarantees as G and the 
cumulative size of the taxpayer’s hidden responsibility for supporting the liabilities of 
troubled institutions as (T).  T and G increase with system fragility (F). In turn, whenever 
F grows, p also rises. During the early stages of an incipient crisis, increments in the 
probability of breakdown depend on the informativeness (A) of the accounting principles 
that banks and safety-net officials use to report losses and loss exposures: 
      p=p[G,T,F;A] .            (2) 
 
During these early stages, banks and their regulators are tempted to seek and provide 
“accounting relief.”  However, once market participants begin to recognize partial 
recapitalizations and coverups as half-measures, weaknesses in A compound the problem 
and improvements in A become a critical part of the crisis-resolution process.   17 
Figure One 
Five Stages of a Regulation-Induced Banking Crisis 
 
1.  Rent-Seeking Generates Aggressive Loss Exposures at Highly 
Leveraged Institutions 
·  Pursuit of Safety-Net Subsidies Tied to Government-Promoted 
Forms of Lending 
·  Pursuit of Subsidies Tied to Other Kinds of Leveraged Risk-
Taking 
 
2.  Adverse Events and Industry Problems Upset Financial Markets 
·  Banks and Regulators Keep Losses from Registering on Bank 
Books by Accounting Trickery and Coverup 
·  Large-Denomination Creditors Test the Strength of the Safety Net 
·  Fragility of System Rises as Good Assets are Collateralized and 
Endgame Incentives Induce Go-For-Broke Gambling  
·  Threat of Shortages in Safety-Net Funding Rises Over Time 
 
3.  Supplementation of Traditional Safety-Net Support Mechanisms  
·  Loans from Central-Bank Discount Window Can’t Carry the Load 
·  Inventive Accounting Loopholes and Forms of Public Credit 
Expand 
 
4.  Recapitalization of Troubled Banks and Safety-Net Institutions 
A. Stopgap Partial Recapitalizations: Half-Measures Move the 
Financial Sector Back into Stage Two of the Cycle 
B.  Transformation of Bank Losses into Explicit Taxpayer 
Obligations or Explicit Nationalization of Zombie Banks 
 
5.  Final Clean-Up of the Mess 
·  Reprivatization of Zombie Institutions 
·  Blame Heaped on Designated Scapegoats 
·  Credible Safety-Net Reforms are Adopted   18 
Rolling and incompletely resolved crises sound at least three alarms. First, the frequency 
and geographic extent of banking crises convincingly demonstrate that, around the world, 
numerous banks have found it reasonable to book potentially ruinous risks.  Looking at 
the period 1977-1995, Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) cite 58 countries in which the net 
worth of the banking system was almost or entirely eliminated.  Second, in country after 
country, domestic (and sometimes foreign) taxpayers have been billed to bail out banks, 
depositors, and deposit-insurance funds.  Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) confirm that, in 
recent crises, taxpayers’ bill for making good on implicit and explicit guarantees typically 
ran between 1 and 10 percent of GDP.  The size of these bailouts establishes that, at least 
in crisis countries, banks managed to put large bets on the table and were able to shift a 
substantial amount of the downside of these bets to taxpayers.  In many cases, authorities 
were eventually blamed for the size of the bills taxpayers were asked to pay.  Officials 
were seen to have shirked their duties to expose and stop loss-causing patterns of credit 
allocation and to have compounded the damage from credit losses by not addressing 
individual-bank insolvencies until their situation had deteriorated disastrously.   
In times of financial turmoil, weaknesses in ethical controls on the job 
performance of government regulators responsible for protecting the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions encourage regulatory forbearance.  The high cost of 
modern crises indicates how far the risk-taking preferences of officials responsible for 
managing taxpayer risk exposures diverge from those of large-denomination creditors in 
private financial markets.  Although institutional mechanisms for financing safety-net 
loans and guarantees differ across countries, poor information flows and incentive 
conflict in government policymaking complicate the treatment of banking crises 
everywhere. 
Special problems of accountability and incentive conflict arise in managing cross-
country risk exposures. Financial regulators subject foreign banks and the foreign 
operations of domestic banks to patterns of regulation that differ in two important ways 
from those that apply to strictly domestic banking operations.  First, most developed 
countries are willing to allow their domestic banks to book a wider range of risks in 
foreign subsidiaries than they are prepared to tolerate in home-country offices.  This is 
because relationships with internationally active customers are a geographically footloose   19 
part of the banking business and because government officials don’t expect to confront 
responsibility for foreign banking losses in domestic political arenas.  This creates 
incentives for offshore banks to “overlend” into foreign markets.  Second, though greatly 
weakened by technological change and outside political pressure, obstacle to the entry of 
foreign financial firms in most banking markets still exist. 
 
V.  Globalization and Securitization of Bank Funding Opportunities 
Contemporary theories of industrial organization seek to explain how a product’s 
market structure evolves through time to permit efficient firms and efficient contracting 
instruments to reshape or displace relatively less-efficient alternatives.  The force of these 
theories is particularly easy to grasp when we focus on hypothetical markets that meet a 
set of ideal conditions that Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1986) call “perfect 
contestability.” 
A market is perfectly contestable when entry and exit costs are each zero and 
incumbent firms exit quickly whenever they find themselves faced with negative profits.  
In perfectly contestable markets, low-cost firms readily displace high-cost firms and 
incumbent competitors are prevented from setting monopoly prices by the threat of hit-
and-run entry by other equally-efficient firms.  Financial markets are never perfectly 
contestable. New entrants must adapt and expand their information systems before they 
can safely expand their customer base. Incumbents cannot easily abandon the pipeline of 
loan commitments they have promised to customers and the regulatory foundations on 
which inherently nontransparent financial markets must be built are burdened with 
inescapable entry and exit costs.  
During the last thirty years, particularly in wholesale banking markets, 
technological change has steadily lowered entry costs for foreign and nontraditional 
competitors.  Most of these firms undertook banking activities in innovative ways, 
making creative use of substitute products, substitute organizational forms, and substitute 
offshore locations.  In some countries, the viability of a new entrant’s business plan was 
temporarily enhanced by longstanding restrictions on how banks could compete 
domestically.   20 
Chief among the innovative methods of doing business was structured 
securitization. With help from investment banks, credit-rating agencies, mortgage 
insurers, and hedge funds, banks sliced and securitized titles to the cash flows from their 
loans in ways that assigned the slicing (or “tranching”), reslicing, and servicing of flows 
of interest and principal to separately capitalized conduit vehicles. By placing important 
tranches of their loans through and with foreign and nonbank firms, banks permanently 
layered the institutional character and broadened the geographic span of bank funding 
arrangements.  
Innovative funding technologies benefited borrowers by integrating bank loan 
pricing within and across countries. However, outsourcing the funding side of a bank’s 
balance sheet weakened its staff members’ due diligence by severing the link between the 
income a lender could make from originating securitizable loans and the quality of its 
system for underwriting the loans it originated. Investors in a securitized pool of loans 
did not rely on either the lender’s or their own due diligence. Instead, they expected 
credit-rating agencies to assess the risks in the positions they were offered and they 
expected investment banks and mortgage insurers to make sure that the returns offered 
would respond appropriately to differences in loan quality.  Unfortunately, the naïveté 
with which these expectations were held undermined agents’ incentives to meet them. 
Compensation for rating and pricing individual securities was collected as soon as the 
securities were floated, with little exposure to ex post blowback for personnel that might 
later be shown to have made a serious rating or pricing mistake. With supervisors closing 
their eyes to the erosion of this chain of agents’ contractual incentives to execute 
faithfully their duties of loyalty, competence, and care, investors presumed that they were 
purchasing titles to well-rated and well-priced securities.  
Securitization also brought firms that were supervised in different regulatory 
cultures and jurisdictions into sharper competition with one another.  This mutual 
invasion of traditional markets by institutions headquartered in different regulatory 
cultures put pressure on particular regulatory enterprises (especially at enterprises whose 
leaders’ remaining terms in office promised to be short) to relax vigilance as a way of 
defending their bureaucratic turf. In retrospect, it is clear that banking supervisors did this 
by regularizing and legitimating cutting-edge ways to hide or transfer risk without fully   21 
exploring the threats that these complex new contracting structures imposed on individual 
country safety nets. 
Whenever a regulator acquiesced in innovative entry by a foreign or 
nontraditional firm, it had to relax restraints that might make it hard for its traditional 
clients to compete with the new entrants. Institutions pressed politicians to make this 
happen sooner rather than later.  
Authorities’ positive response to this competitive pressure has been labeled 
financial deregulation, but our ethical perspective makes it clear that the response is 
better described as desupervision..  In most countries, regulatory competition and defects 
in accountability led banking supervisors to assess the risks of innovative instruments of 
risk transfer with less watchfulness than these instruments deserved. With respect to 
structured securitizations, banking supervisors and mortgage-insurance firms outsourced 
their duty of vision to accountants and credit-rating agencies without adequately bonding 
the obligations they were asking them to perform. They did this despite these firms’ 
obvious conflicts in goals and outsized delays in downgrading distressed securities in past 
downturns (Portes, 2008). 
The contestability of banking markets is greatly reduced by the political clout that 
domestic banks enjoy and by the ability of supervisory entities to bill government safety 
nets for the losses their heedlessness might engender.  In crises, safety-net subsidies 
disadvantage less-subsidized competitors and unreasonably sustain the operations of 
decapitalized banks.  The contestable-markets portrayal of market-structure evolution 
helps us to understand that in most countries deregulation focused on unblocking entry 
without addressing supervisory incentives to resist the exit of important domestic banks. 
Bank and supervisory exit resistance attenuates the benefits to society that entry 
relaxation would otherwise produce.  Banking crises teach foreign and nontraditional 
competitors the need to estimate the extent of supervisor-supported exit resistance.  By 
standing ready to absorb the losses of unprofitable clients, a regulator (especially a 
central bank) can prevent low-cost entrants from earning the profits needed to justify hit-
and-run entry.   
 
VI.  Dialectics of a Regulation-Induced Banking Crisis   22 
For any policymaker, a crisis may be described as a time of upheaval that 
generates strong pressure for decisive changes in policy strategy.  Figure Two portrays a 
regulation-induced banking crisis as an evolutionary process that is driven in Hegelian 
fashion by dialectical collisions of irreconcilable market and regulatory adjustments. 
For any regulated institution, change – not rest – represents the path of profit-
making equilibrium. The Hegelian model of regulation assumes that the conflict between 
regulated parties and their regulators can never be completely eliminated. The 
contradictory forces at work in each round of adjustments are labeled the “thesis” and the 
“antithesis.” Every sequence of adjustment and response produces a temporary 
“synthesis” that serves in turn as the “thesis” for a new round of action and response. 
In the US, policies designed to promote homeownership encouraged borrowers 
and lenders alike to operate with a “perilously high degree of leverage” (Shadow 
Financial Regulatory Committee, 2008). For borrowers, the value of the subsidies that 
they could derive both from tax deductions for mortgage interest and from federal 
programs supporting mortgage credit increased with the amount they borrowed. For 
lenders, federal programs supported the securitization of home mortgages by offering 
cheap guarantees and by making it possible for banks to avoid capital requirements on 
mortgages that they chose to securitize. Bank supervisors did not require banks either to 
estimate or to hold capital against the implicit obligations that structured securitization 
vehicles passed through to a sponsor’s net worth. The high degree of leverage on 
borrower positions meant that, if and when housing prices declined by more than a few 
percent, marginal borrowers would be unable to service their obligations. Once a sharp 
increase in delinquencies and foreclosures by subprime borrowers occurred, savvy 
investors revalued and cut back their positions in securitized mortgage pools. When this 
revaluation wiped out the equity of mortgage securitization conduits, reputational 
concerns persuaded bank sponsors to move a good portion of conduit losses back onto 
their balance sheets. Besides being billed for conduit losses, banks that had been heavily 
involved in originating mortgages for sale to conduits were stuck with losses on pipelines 
of ongoing mortgage commitments that they could no longer profitably securitize. 
Inevitably, silent runs on these banks tested the ability of safety-net managers to manage 
a spreading crisis.   23 
FIGURE TWO 
DIALECTICS OF A REGULATION-INDUCED CRISIS 
 
THESIS:  UNSUSTAINABLE POLICY MIX 
·  Expansionary Monetary Policy and Loss-Causing Credit-Allocation 
Scheme (“politically sabotaged loans”) vs. Adverse Effects of 
Desupervising Risks on the Costs of Providing Safety-Net Support for 
Loss-Making Banks 
ANTITHESIS:  SKEPTICAL INVESTORS AND DEPOSITORS TEST 
GOVERNMENTS’ ABILITY TO MANAGE THE EXPANDING COSTS 
OF NATIONAL SAFETY NETS 
·  In a Banking Crisis, Market Tests consist of Silent Runs (Symptomized by 
a Generalized Flight to Quality and Simplicity) 
·  The probability of a deepening crisis rises the longer authorities refuse to 
contain the damage and continue to help zombie institutions to stay in play 
SYNTHESIS:  REFORM OCCURS WHEN AUTHORITIES CAN NO 
LONGER QUELL MARKET DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO 
SUSTAIN THE CONTRADICTORY POLICY MIX.  
·  Credit-allocation scheme unravels 
·  Costs of sustaining decapitalized institutions become manifest 
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The appropriate policy response to crisis pressures depends on the nature of the 
policy contradictions that occasioned the crisis.  A perennial issue is to assess the 
potential insolvency of troubled banks and to determine how rapidly bank net worth is 
being undermined by falling prices on crisis-creating loans.  Asset-price meltdowns are 
most likely to occur when incentives for overlending by domestic and offshore 
institutions confront a host-country policy regime that offers incentives for 
overborrowing at domestic households and firms.  In such cases, pressure on asset prices 
is apt to generate a crisis-intensifying run from claims issued by the insolvent borrowers 
and lenders. 
It is superficial to conceive of the silent runs that triggered the US securitization 
crisis as manifestations of an underprovision of aggregate “liquidity.”  In fact, the central 
bank has for many years accommodated overspending in the favored sector and also 
financed a long run of current-account deficits.  A central bank can prolong a payments 
deficit by letting its currency decline and by drawing down the country’s foreign-
exchange reserves and foreign lines of credit.  In any consumption-driven currency 
devaluation, the need to rebuild the central banks’ currency reserves may or may not be 
urgent.  If it is, authorities can shrink the current-account deficit in two complementary 
ways: (1) by allowing the exchange rate to decline even further and (2) by tightening 
their mix of fiscal and monetary policies. 
But when a money-center country is experiencing a banking crisis, this 
prescription is unattractive. These policies would impose a sizeable opportunity loss on 
foreign and domestic holders of the country’s financial assets.  The currency-adjustment 
half of this strategy would put inflationary pressure on domestic prices.  To pile on the 
tight-money half of the prescription would induce a decline in aggregate economic 
demand, whose effects would reduce the real value of a country’s financial assets in 
general and the net worth of its banking system in particular.  This would further 
undermine asset values by raising prospective rates of default and delinquency on 
troubled assets. In crisis circumstances, it is politically impossible for authorities to 
ignore the effects that these adjustments would have on safety-net loss exposures.   
In a financial center country, authorities face a Three-Way Policy Dilemma about 
how to control a silent run:   25 
1.  Choice One:  Try to finance the runs with minimal adjustment in the loss-
causing parts of the policy mix.  We may describe this strategy as 
disinformational “hardball.”  Authorities may temporarily nationalize one or 
more insolvent institutions and deny that any other zombies exist. They may 
or may not soften the potential decline in their exchange rate by drawing 
down reserves or borrowing from private and official foreign sources. 
2.  Choice Two:  Rebalance the policy mix to make it more sustainable, but only 
with respect to a narrowly defined window of time (e.g., until after the next 
election).  Authorities may resolve or strengthen some of the weakest 
institutions and may slow monetary growth.  We have described this as a 
strategy of “partial recapitalization.” 
3.  Choice Three (unlikely to be chosen unless prior efforts to use one or both of 
the other strategies have failed dramatically): Face up to and eliminate the 
most obvious contradictions in the policy mix.  The new policy regime should 
aim for a full cleanup of insolvent institutions and to establish a more 
incentive-compatible supervisory system going forward. 
Leaving bank and corporate insolvencies unresolved fosters further 
malinvestment and enhances the likelihood that a deeper crisis will emerge down the line.  
Still, it is dangerous to acknowledge and resolve corporate and banking insolvencies in 
the midst of a national recession.  In crisis circumstances, politicians are strongly tempted 
to reflate demand and to strengthen the credibility of safety-net guarantees, without doing 
much to resolve the incentive distortions that widespread insolvency creates.   
 
VII.  The Role of Regulatory Competition in Banking Crises 
Contradictory policies misallocate capital in the household, financial, corporate, 
and government-planning sectors. The result is that asset values and bank net worth 
eventually have to be written down.  Had asset values either been supported by a 
sustainable expansion in productive capacity or been written down promptly as 
unfavorable information surfaced, silent runs would not have become large enough to test 
the safety nets of financial-center countries.   26 
The seeds of the 2007-2008 subprime crisis were sown over many decades. They 
did not flower into a crisis until doubts began to surface about authorities’ willingness 
and ability to measure and absorb the losses and loss exposures confronting a suddenly 
decapitalized banking system.  Measurement is important. As in the 1980s savings-and-
loan mess, crisis costs were intensified by openly delaying loss recognition at loss-
making institutions.   
What the press describes as a “banking crisis” may be more accurately described 
as the surfacing of tensions caused by the continuing efforts of loss-making banks to 
force the rest of society to accept responsibility for their unpaid bills for making bad 
loans.  In US mortgage markets, longstanding systems for subsidizing poorly 
underwritten loans to builders and overleveraged households imposed unbooked losses 
both on banks and on supporting national safety nets.   
Around the world, financial institutions and markets are supported by regulatory 
systems that show numerous country-specific features (Wilson, 1986; Dermine, 2003; 
Barth, et al., 2006).  Differences in patterns of financial regulation address differences 
that exist in the various economic, political, and bureaucratic deficiencies and 
inefficiencies that each country’s regulatory system is overtly or covertly expected to 
correct (Garcia and Nieto, 2006; Herring and Schuermann, 2006). 
However, the survival of differences in regulatory patterns is limited by the 
tendency of funding and loan-making opportunities to flow to markets and institutions 
that offer their customers the best deal.  The extent to which net regulatory burdens on 
financial markets and institutions differ across countries is narrowed by the regulatory 
arbitrage that interjurisdictional deal flows entail.  When and as technological change in 
information processing and telecommunications lowers the cost of transacting with 
foreign entities, adverse flows of capital and financial dealmaking help to persuade a 
nation’s authorities to lower the net burdens that their regulatory framework imposes on 
the savers and investors that book deals in its financial markets. 
In recent years, rolling banking and currency crises have become frequent for 
three reasons.  First, advances in information and communications technology have 
simultaneously globalized banking markets and markets for government guarantees.  
Second, the globalization of markets for banking and guarantee services has made it less   27 
costly for domestic corporations and wealthy investors to mount silent runs on a 
country’s zombie banks. Third, lenders, securitizers, credit-rating organizations, and 
supervisory authorities are not compensated in ways that make them accountable for the 
slow-developing but inevitable losses that their policies engender. 
In 1997-1998, crises in Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand 
were hastened by the technologically driven absorption of these countries into an 
international market for loanable funds that allowed large depositors to protect 
themselves against the burdens of inefficient or discriminatory patterns of national 
regulation.  Globalization put the costs and benefits of banking regulation in these 
countries into closer competition with the regulatory systems of offshore financial 
centers. 
Offshore banking competition shortened in two ways the crisis-gestation period 
featured in traditional crisis models (such as Krugman, 1979).  First, even limited entry 
by outside banks expanded the stock of well-priced domestically available substitutes for 
deposits that local citizens had previously held in host-country banks.  This lowered the 
cost to Asian depositors of participating in a silent run on domestic banks.  Second, the 
relative safety of foreign-bank deposit substitutes demonstrated the greater reliability of 
the performance guarantees written for each offshore entrant by the regulatory systems of 
its homeland. 
Each crisis constitutes an exit cost that society incurs to shrink the domain of a 
high-cost or discriminatory regulator.  Regulation-induced crises are triggered by efforts 
to avoid the inefficiencies and inequities that political maneuvering interjects into 
particular markets for regulatory services.  Squeezing the equilibrium rents that short-
sighted or corruptible officials can extract and distribute to their supporters disciplines 
incumbent regulators, but only at the margin. To improve public-service contracting in 
the longer run will require authorities to expose themselves to blowback for the delayed 
effects of policy mistakes by accepting a performance-based scheme of deferred 
compensation. 
Exploitive regulation drives sophisticated depositors, unsubsidized borrowers, and 
other bank stakeholders to book at least some of their business elsewhere: either abroad 
or in informal or differently regulated domestic markets.  Such regulatory arbitrage limits   28 
the extent to which politicians can promote a distribution of regulatory burdens that 
arbitrarily narrows opportunities for important sectors of a national economy to 
accumulate and manage their wealth. 
The normative goal of financial reform should be to induce nondiscriminatory and 
efficient patterns of regulation and supervision.  Regulators should be made accountable 
not just for producing a stable financial economy, but for providing this stability fairly 
and at minimum long-run cost to society.  In practice, this means establishing contractual 
incentives that would lead authorities to follow market-mimicking standards of 
supervisory performance. In the absence of explicit or implicit government guarantees, 
markets would insist that any bank that experiences a spate of opportunity-cost losses do 
one or more of three things: shrink, raise more equity capital, or pay higher interest rates 
for its debt.  The public policy problem is to design employment contracts that would 
make it in supervisors’ self-interest to invoke “market-mimicking” disciplines when and 
as a country’s important institutions weaken. 
Although officials understand that strengthening bank supervision is part of crisis 
resolution, they seem reluctant to identify the behavioral norms and incentive structures 
that made a crisis country’s supervision weak in the first place or to recommend public-
service contracting and reporting reforms that would be strong enough to make tougher 
supervision serve an incentive-conflicted regulator’s self-interest. 
For any regime, the size of tolerable deviations from a fair and efficient 
distribution of net regulatory burdens increases with the opportunity costs its citizens face 
in engaging in capital flight.  In turn, the benefits and costs of capital flight evolve with 
information technology, the volatility of the real economy, and the fluidity of the political 
environment.  The information revolution that is underway in finance today makes it 
short-sighted and inequitable to adopt credit-allocation schemes that inexorably eat away 
at the capital of a country’s banks and that require taxpayers to subsidize weak banks and 
uneconomic patterns of real investment.  Credit-rating agencies and the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision would be well-advised to abandon sampling procedures that set 
aside the costs of adverse tail events and models that presume that asset risks are 
relatively stationary over time.  They should focus also on finding ways both to bond the 
scrupulousness with which staff members perform their supervisory duties and to enlist   29 
forward-looking betting and derivatives markets to help them track the changing odds of 
defaults in individual countries and industries (Kane, 2003).     30 
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